



Illicit Arms Trafficking in the Developing World





Introduction

The problem presented by illicit small arms and light weapons (SALW) trade has existed for some time, but until recently was only limited to localities within states. For example, illicit arms trafficking by the Irish Republican Army smuggled arms to undermine and attack the British government, but was confined within the borders of the United Kingdom. Recently, illicit SALW trade has become globalized and has perpetuated conflicts in the most unstable areas of the world. In 2002, West African gun smugglers persuaded the Nicaraguan government to sell thousands of assault rifles and ammunition by posing as a legitimate broker on the behalf of the Panamanian National Police who were seeking to get new weapons, but redirected those weapons to be sold in conflict zones across the globe (Stohl 21-26). Such global deals have made the problem of illicit small arms and light weapons trade particularly difficult to contain and combat. Additionally, the presence of a legitimate market for the trade of small arms and light weapons between State governments further complicates combating illicit arms networks.

Statement of the Problem

On the surface the illicit trade of SALWs may seem inconsequential and even innocuous with the terms “small” and “light” attached to them. The reality is that these weapons pose a serious problem that have a profound effect on the developing world conflicts. Illicit SALW trade contributes to an estimated 60-90% of more than 100,000 conflict deaths each year and thousands of additional deaths

outside of conflict areas many which occur both in the developed and developing world (Small Arms Survey). Additionally, the trafficking of illicit arms to developing countries is a black market industry worth billions of dollars and has contributed approximately 10-20% of the total arms to conflicts in developing countries (Small Arms Survey). Thus, the problem of SALW trafficking is a significant factor that perpetuates conflicts each year in the developing world and even affects organized crime in the developed world.

Currently, there are *numerous* known networks engaged in illicit trafficking of SALW and undoubtedly some networks that have not been discovered yet. The international community has had great difficulty removing illicit trafficking of SALWs for a number of reasons. Illicit arms traffickers are extremely innovative and effectively exploit international channels, established systems and infrastructure weaknesses where they exist and create new channels where they do not exist by operating on a person to person basis through a network (Stohl 22). Thus, once an established channel that is used by the arms traffickers is discovered and shut down the network finds new ways to traffic arms.

Means of Acquiring Small Arms and Light Weapons

There are several methods commonly employed by arms traffickers to transport weapons surreptitiously. The most efficient way to ship weapons is often to send the weapons directly to a destination State and pay off any customs officials who inspect shipments and are often underpaid and subject to corruption. The second method involves taking arms from poorly secured government weapons stockpiles and transporting them to a





market that will readily accept and purchase arms. A third method is that weapons can be stolen during times of governmental instability such as a coup, from developing states and can be transported to other areas with a demand for SALWs. Fourth, some weapons are lost during operations and end up being sold on the black market. Another way weapons end up being trafficked is that the soldiers that are using their weapons sell them for money especially when soldiers' salaries have not been paid (Stohl 23). With these numerous means of acquiring weapons and a high demand for weapons the strength of illicit arms trade has been particularly difficult especially in preventing their injection into areas of conflict.

Small Arms and Light Weapons Statistics

Estimates place the total number of small arms in circulation worldwide at 640 million small arms (Krause 22-24). Of the total worldwide stock of SALWs, millions are trafficked and injected into conflicts and generating billions of dollars each year. Put simply, the illicit trafficking of SALWs is a global security problem which "fuels instability" and have increasingly been sold in the developing world (Stohl 22). Within the developing world illicit arms networks have tended to capitalize in areas where weak governments and impoverished conditions are pervasive and are vulnerable targets for so-called "gunrunners" to initiate illicit arms trade to terrorist networks, paramilitary groups, and anyone willing to pay the cost thus fueling conflicts and further exasperating the economic, social and political problems in these regions.

Some countries that have been targeted by illicit arms traffickers include Sierra Leone, Indonesia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Colombia which have had long running conflicts. Thus, weak states such as these often make up the developing world and are unable to prevent illicit arms trafficking because of weak governments. These governments often struggle to combat the conflicts in their territories and are unable to combat illicit arms traffickers. Furthermore, even when these weak governments begin to gain the upper hand in these conflicts, the illicit arms remain behind to fuel violence in future uprisings.

Though this topic focuses specifically on Developing areas of the world which include some of the most unstable states, this problem is particularly dangerous for Developed States as well. This fact is acknowledged in a 2008 Brookings Institution Report regarding weak states which claimed, "threats to international peace and security often come from the world's weakest states" and "pose as great a risk to our international security as strong states" as they are often incubators for terrorist networks and paramilitary groups (Rice and Patrick 5). As one observer of the conflicts in Democratic Republic of the Congo commented, "SALWs are our weapons of mass destruction" (Krause 38).

History of the Problem

Specific Definition of Small Arms and Light Weapons

The Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms provided a definition of the wide range





of weapons that constitute SALW's in their report A/52/298, annex which stated that:

“Small arms and light weapons are weapons manufactured to military specifications for use as lethal instruments of war. They are used by all armed forces, including internal security forces, for, inter alia, self-protection or self-defense, close or short-range combat, direct or indirect fire and against tanks or aircraft at relatively short distances. Broadly speaking, small arms are those weapons designed for personal use and light weapons are those designed for use by several persons serving as a crew. The weapons addressed in the present report are categorized as follows: small arms include revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine-guns, assault rifles and light machine-guns; light weapons include heavy machine-guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft-guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missiles and rocket systems, portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems and mortars of a caliber of less than 100 mm (ibid, paras. 24-26).” (A/58/138).

Thus the weapons that constitute SALW are varied and generally designed to be “lethal instruments of war” or as support to other criminal activities such as drug trafficking and terrorism. Examples of these weapons include: revolvers, pistols, rifles, assault rifles, various machine guns, anti-aircraft, anti-tank, and even shoulder fired missiles, e.g. Stinger Missiles (A/58/138). Yet there are a variety of unique problems associated with attempting to curb the trafficking of these dangerous weapons.

Qualities of Illicit Arms Trafficking Networks

The means of transporting SALWs has continually adapted in order to overcome international efforts to stop the traffickers. Currently, the distribution of SALW is extremely sophisticated and has developed into a fully autonomous underground economy with virtually no need for outside assistance in order to function. This economy consists of an advanced network of independent suppliers, distributors, and financiers who manage arms trafficking operations as well as legitimate businesses globally (Naylor 48). Moreover, these networks cooperate to deliver illicit arms to their destination States and are self-supporting by protecting each other in order to ensure delivery and maintain profits from arms sales. Thus, in order to effectively combat these networks addressing the way these organizations function must be addressed. Arms trafficking networks will break its connections to some members of the organization and continually restructure themselves in order to survive.

However, over the past few years efforts have begun to focus on the arms brokers within illicit arms trafficking networks. Within arms networks, brokers can be described as “middlemen” who organize and connect arms transfers between two or more parties. Thus, arms brokers connect the buyers, sellers, transporters, financiers and insurers in order to make sure that arms are reliably delivered (Small Arms Survey). These arms brokers are the “work horses” who navigate intricate networks on a global scale by creating the front companies, complex transportation routes and fraudulent





financial transfers through offshore banking and shell companies.

Additionally, arms brokers find stocks of weapons at the right price through a variety of means including: forging documents, bribing officials, and paying transporters sub-contracted through their complex transportation routes (Yankey-Wayne). Additionally, brokers involved with international crime networks that transport illicit arms are often also involved in transporting drugs and other prohibited goods leading to separate but related problems (Yankey-Wayne). Worldwide only 52 States have adopted domestic legislation that would prohibit, monitor or control arms brokering activities, and as a result in most, if not all of the developing world arms brokers are completely unregulated and operate with impunity (Cattaneo). Thus, even though arms brokers are a particularly crucial aspect of the illicit arms trafficking networks states have yet to fully acknowledge the need to implement domestic legal actions.

Challenges of Illicit Arms Trafficking

The SALW problem is more difficult to prevent than other illicit trade, such as the illicit trade of heavy weapons (e.g. ballistic missile hardware, weapons of mass destruction) and illicit drugs. One reason is that there is already a thriving industry for the legitimate sale of SALW to law enforcement, military, etc. Thus, arms can be smuggled along with legitimate arms by using forged documents, and then directed to different destinations such as terrorist groups. This transportation of illicit arms is a so called “gray market” transaction because it begins with a legitimate, legal destination but is then directed for

illegal purposes. Additionally, it may be unclear whether or not the weapons are for legitimate applications or for illicit criminal activities or use in conflicts because there is no regulation of borders. Often times, weapons must be transported to supply law enforcement with weapons, but arms traffickers may sell arms to terrorists and paramilitary groups leading to the ability to forge documents and make illicit weapons seem to be legal. This leads to a complex enforcement challenge for customs officers, police and other law enforcement because illicit trade can often appear to be legitimate when they exit a state, but never reach the “intended” destination state and are sold for illegal purposes. Thus, any attempt at a resolution of this problem must address the challenge of enforcement to solve the illicit arms trafficking problem.

Another issue is that the SALW lacks uniform international standards for arms sales. Illicit arms traffickers are perhaps most effective at finding the loopholes and limitations of the law to pursue their illicit trade. Thus, areas that have little enforcement become havens for the illicit trade of SALW that are distributed to developing areas of the world where there is a market for such weapons. Another related aspect of lack of uniform law standards is that many weapons lack adequate documentation and serial numbers, and are subsequently freely traded because the states where these weapons are sold do not require serial numbers to be sold.

Past UN/International Action

The first UN resolution that took on the problem of illicit trafficking of SALW was





A/RES/50/70B adopted by the General Assembly on January 15, 1996, and attempted to increase transparency in governments of the Member-states.

This resolution responds to how the arms are used and reaffirms the goals of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms to ensure arms used by states are registered with serial numbers. Though this resolution accomplished little substantive results it paved the way for future programs such as the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects or more succinctly Program of Action (PoA).

United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects,

The PoA created a series of actions to combat the problem of illicit SALWs trafficking. The main actions the PoA recommended was that Member-states should:

- Pass state legislation criminalizing production and possession of illicit SALWs
- Maintain accurate records and registration of legal small arms
- Destroy stocks of illicit weapons that have been detained
- Establish national small arms coordination agencies to combat SALWs
- Ensure proper serial numbers on weapons produced
- Cooperation with other states to identify and track SALWs internationally
- Support and enforce regional efforts including moratoria and embargoes and

support of efforts to combat proliferation of SALWs (Quaker United Nations Office).

Though nearly all states have signed the PoA, 44 states have failed to ever submit a report on actions toward its implementation since it was signed in July 2001. This implies that many states have taken no steps towards the PoA's implementation despite the numerous security problems associated with illicit SALW trafficking.

Based on the states that did submit reports only 54% reported that they had cooperated internationally with neighbors on illicit SALW arms trafficking in response to the recommendations of the PoA (Cattaneo 29-31). Thus, with this low level of cooperation (e.g. information sharing, cooperative border control, etc.) between states more cooperation is needed to combat trafficking. Additionally, in the area of combating arms brokering at the national level, 22 states reported that they had taken no actions toward preventing brokering, 8 states claimed brokering is "not an issue", 15 states had implicitly prohibited arms brokering through existing legislation, 33 states are currently developing arms brokering controls and 52 states have taken legal actions to criminalize arms brokering activities under the PoA (Cattaneo 39-41). Moreover, surplus and stockpile control has not been pursued in line with PoA recommendations.

Despite the PoA being the first major effort to combat illicit trading of SALWs it has also predictably led the way for future actions. The PoA has led to the establishment of an Open-Ended Working Group to Negotiate an International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (OEWG) as





well as a Group of Governmental Experts focused on researching trends in illicit SALW trade. *Group of Governmental Experts Reports on Small Arms*

the import, export, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition from or across the territory of one State Party to that of another State

The Group Governmental of Experts (GGE) was established with the goal of "undertak[ing] a study, within existing resources, for examining the feasibility of developing an international instrument to enable States to identify and trace in a timely and reliable manner, illicit SALW". The GGE completed the *Group Governmental of Experts Reports on Small Arms in 2003, which recommended "the development of an international instrument to enable States to identify and trace, in a timely and reliable manner, illicit small arms and light weapons is both desirable and feasible"* ("Group of Governmental). Despite this recommendation there has not yet been any permanent mechanism specifically established to these ends. The lack of a permanent international instrument and is a critical tool that could help with coordination efforts and would help address global nature of the illicit SALW problem.

Party if any one of the States Parties concerned does not authorize it in accordance with the terms of this Protocol or if the firearms are not marked in accordance with article 8 of this Protocol" (Protocol Against the...).

Furthermore, the Protocol furthered efforts to criminalize illicit trafficking of SALW by established recommendations for States that are party to the Protocol to follow when adopting national laws to curb illicit arms trafficking activities. As a result, greater pressure has been put on the 91 States that signed and/or ratified the treaty to adopt and enforce measures to stop illicit arms trafficking (Protocol Against the...). This treaty has helped focus the international community's efforts on by defining the main challenges of illicit SALW trafficking to give concrete steps to take to remove illicit SALW trafficking, but has shown little evidence of progress toward these steps.

Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition

Case Studies

Illicit Arms Trafficking in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

This Protocol was established in 2001 and entered into force on July 3, 2005 in order "to strengthen and unify international cooperation and develop cohesive mechanisms to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition" ("Protocol Against..."). The Protocol created great progress towards defining illicit arms trafficking as:

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo) is a sub-Saharan African State that has been plagued by decades of unending conflict and has a government that is often weak and corrupt. The problems the DR Congo have been exasperated by illicit arms trafficking to numerous rebel groups that have fought with and against the DR Congo. Though the DR Congo has the largest UN





peacekeeping operation with 18,691 uniformed UN Peacekeepers, it has been unable to create a lasting peace in the conflict between the diverse rebel groups that are resupplied with ammunition and weapons by illicit arms networks. The result has been a civil war that has lasted more than a decade in the Congo evidence to the fact that even though some rebels are killed or move elsewhere, the effect of large quantities weapons on destabilizing a region remains for many years (MONUC).

One major group that operates in the eastern provinces of the DR Congo is the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). The FDLR seeks to repatriate themselves from a regime called the Rwandan Patriotic Force (RPF), which they describe as “barbaric” and “ruthless” and “bloodthirsty”, and have this taken refuge in the eastern border provinces of the Congo as their base of operations (FDLR). The FDLR and other ethnic rebel groups have consistently engaged in a variety of human rights violations including rape, child soldiers and buyers of illicit SALWs trade from arms brokers to further their political and military goals. However, the Congolese military has also allegedly engaged in similar human rights abuses and gain many of their arms and ammunition from illicit arms brokers. Thus, the entrenched illicit arms trade has become a hard to remove staple in the Congo.

Though the FDLR continues to remain active, and is supported by illicit arms recent developments have led to the prospect of progress in the region. In January 2009, the FDLR’s leader Laurent Nkunda, was arrested by the Rwandan Government on charges of treason in Rwanda. In the process many of his rebel forces vowed to integrate into the Congolese military, but many rebel forces

have a habit of switching sides in the ethnic conflict. However, violence has continued despite the removal of Nkunda. In spite of the removal of Nkunda, numerous attempts at achieving peace through multiparty negotiations largely because of shifting alliances among rebel groups. Though there may be ceasefires and a temporary peace for a matter of days this quickly degrades into further violence due to the presence of large quantities of weapons.

The flow of weapons into the conflict has a lasting effect in the Congo. Moreover, the presence of illicit arms trafficking has a destabilizing effect in the developing world. In a 2005 report a group of experts stated, “Internal trafficking in arms and ammunition through the illegal appropriations or diversions mentioned in various independent reports constitutes a genuine threat to the peace process.” (“Trafficking in Illicit...”). It is estimated that from 2002 to 2003 400 tons of surplus Kalishnikov ammunition shipped from Albania and Serbia and a second shipment of 130 tons of arms and ammunition from Bosnia in 2004 were sold to the FDLR and other groups in exchange for precious natural resources such as diamonds (“Illegal arms exports...”).

Transportation of Illicit Arms in the DR Congo

Most arms and ammunition that are transported to the DR Congo and so called “Great Lakes Region of Africa” is done so by air transport and is easily moved across the porous and remote Congolese border to the FDLR and other rebel groups (“Trafficking in Illicit...”). Once the arms arrive in the DR Congo, arms brokers ship the arms and ammunition to distributors to paramilitary groups in the DR Congo. These arms brokers who





participate in the illicit trafficking of SALWs do so with impunity despite a UN Security Council Arms Embargo on the DR Congo (Nyanzi). However, the illicit arms trafficking in the DR Congo continues to occur in the eastern Congo where the government has no laws in place to control on arms brokering activities despite this pervasive problem and there is a state of anarchy (Cattaneo 38). Thus, the problem of SALW arms trafficking in the DR Congo is complicated by a variety of factors and an inability of the Congolese government to maintain its borders, create anti-arms brokering laws, and enforce laws that do exist.

Illicit Arms Trafficking in Colombia

For years Colombia has been faced with a horrific civil war between left-wing guerilla groups and right-wing paramilitary groups. The most infamous of these is the paramilitary group named the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the guerilla group called the National Liberation Army (ELN) who use drug trafficking to generate wealth. These groups then use this money to purchase arms and ammunition, which in turn fuels their civil war to compete for what both say is their protection of the rural poor (Hansen). Recently, both groups have been weakening due to increased funds provided by the U.S. to the Colombian government called Plan Colombia as the U.S. considers both groups to be terrorist organizations and have increasing fought these groups. The number of members in both groups have declined and estimates peg the size of the groups with FARC at around 9,000 fighters and ELN at between 2,200 and 3,000 fighters (Hansen).

Both the FARC and ELN engage in drug trafficking to produce the majority of their income.

The FARC has been alleged to produce 50% of the cocaine production in the world. The FARC traffics its illegal drugs for a profit of an estimated \$200 million to \$300 million annually which is then used to fuel its consumption of illicit arms (Hansen). Furthermore, the FARC levies an extortive tax on poor rural farmers for their “protection” using illicit arms to intimidate and coerce peasant farmers (Hansen). Both groups also engage in terrorist acts, kidnappings and bombing (using illicit arms), but are essentially dependent on their weapons as the source of their power and drugs as the source of their revenue. In 2002 the importance of weapons were demonstrated when the FARC hijacked a commercial jet and kidnapped a Colombian senator, and in 2005 kidnapped 60 people who were held at ransom until other members of their organization are released from prison and extorted large sums of money.

Both the FARC and ELN maintain their supply of ammunition and arms through illicit trafficking of SALW’s. According to the UNODC, the FARC and ELN purchase 80% of the illicit arms that enter Colombia with the remaining 20% going to organized crime groups (UNODC 26). Thus there is a direct relationship between the strength of the organization and the number of illicit SALWs the organization possesses. If the number of illicit arms are reduced by effective border control in rural areas, prosecution of arms brokers and drug combat these terrorist organizations will reduce the power of these organizations.

Illicit Arms Sources Countries

Colombia’s illicit arms come from a variety of neighboring countries and international locations through both gray and black market trade. The gray





market implies that the arms were originally legally sold but were compromised along the way and then illegally trafficked, whereas black market implies that it was always an illicit arms trafficking sale. An example of a gray market transaction is occurred in 1999 when the Peruvian government attempted to legally purchase weapons from the Government of Jordan, but an illicit arms broker diverted and air dropped the shipment into Colombia to the FARC instead. This transaction could have been avoided if the Colombian government had prevented FARC from having de facto sovereign control over rural territories, but because the FARC had a coercive hand in the southern and eastern rural territories of Colombia it gained thousands of illicit arms and increased its coercive power in the region (UNODC 29). Black market weapons come from a variety of sources from corrupt governments to post-conflict zones. In 2004, the corrupt Venezuelan government replaced its army's weapons in favor of AK-47's and transported about 30,000 FAL former army rifles to the FARC and other terrorist groups. Thus, even governments may seek to profit by engaging in illicit arms trafficking and thus help to perpetuate instability in developing countries. Additionally, many SALWs come from conflict zones in Eastern Europe with 50% of illicit SALWs coming from Europe illustrating the global nature of the illicit SALW trade (UNODC 32).

Thus, many issues of the illicit SALW arms problem present in the Colombian case, which is directed towards terrorist groups and promotes conflict in these areas. By confronting the underlying issues many related illicit activities such as illicit drug trafficking could be curtailed which are conducted alongside the illicit arms trade.

Conclusion

There are many amorphous illicit arms networks that have a global reach. Yet, for all these networks the motivation is a desire to profit from the chaos they create, by selling a variety of weapons to non-state actors such as, ethnic groups like the FDLR, radical paramilitary groups, and terrorist groups like the FARC and ELN. The aims of the groups that buy illicit arms are varied as demonstrated from the goals of the FARC to mobilize a leftist revolution for rural populations and the FDLR which wants to retake control of territories for perceived injustices against their ethnic group they both rely on illicit arms. Though these arms may originate from: 1) legitimate sources (e.g. gray market arms sales) with states selling legal weapons to other States that are diverted to illicit arms traffickers and then sold to unsavory groups that wish to promote conflict in the developing world and/or 2) illegitimate sources that are illicit arms networks who seek to profit from illegal sales of weapons and the promotion of conflict in the developing world (e.g. black market arms sales).

Furthermore, illicit arms traffickers target States in the Developing World to a larger extent because these states are unable to control their territory. In addition, these States lack legal restrictions prohibiting illicit arms brokering activities and could not enforce these laws to prevent these activities. Even if these developing states were able to enforce laws, the illicit arms trafficking networks are so are able to find a new ways to sell their illicit arms for profits that they could navigate





the legal restrictions and operate with legal impunity despite the illicit nature of their activities.

The international community has continually struggled to develop an effective international mechanism to effectively combat the global problem of illicit arms trafficking. Thus, delegates of the Disarmament and International Security Committee are called upon to combat the pervasive problem of illicit arms trafficking in the Developing World. Delegates should take into account the ways the illicit arms trafficking networks operate, past UN and international actions, means of combating illicit arms networks operations, the global nature of the problem and the security implications on both Developing and Developed States.



Suggested Research Resources

- A/RES/50/70 D
<http://www.un.org/Depts/ddar/Register/Resolutions/5070.htm>
- Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects
<http://disarmament.un.org/cab/poa.html>
Implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Analysis of the National Report submitted by States from 2002-2008. Silvia Cattaneo and Sarah Parker. United Nations. New York, NY. 2008.
- Group of Governmental Experts Report (A/58/138)
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/426/32/PDF/N0342632.pdf?OpenElement>
Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime
<http://untreaty.un.org/English/TreatyEvent2003/Texts/treaty4E.pdf>
- Weak States Index by the Brookings Institution
http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/02_weak_states_index.aspx
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Violence, Crime and Illegal Arms Trafficking in Colombia”
http://www.fas.org/asmp/resources/govern/109th/UNODC_Colombia_Dec06_en.pdf

Bibliography

- Cattaneo, Silvia and Sarah Parker. “Implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Analysis of the National Report submitted by States from 2002-2008.” UNIDIR. United Nations. New York, NY. 2008.
- FDLR. <http://www.fdlr.org/>
“Group of Governmental Experts on Tracing Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons”.
<http://disarmament.un.org/CAB/salw-tracingexperts.html>
- Hansen, Stephanie. “FARC, ELN: Colombia’s Left-Wing Guerrillas”. March 11, 2008.
<http://www.cfr.org/publication/9272/#1>
- “Illegal arms exports fuelling killings, mass rape and torture”. July 6, 2005.
<http://www.commondreams.org/news2005/0706-03.htm>





- Krause, Keith. "Chapter 2: Facing the Challenge of Small Arms: The UN and Global Security Governance" *The United Nations and Global Security*. Palgrave Macmillan. New York, NY. 2004.
- MONUC. "Democratic Republic of the Congo-MONUC-Facts and Figures".
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/monuc/facts.html>
- Nyanzi, Peter. "Central Africa: Uganda Violates UN Arms Embargo". 17 March 2006.
<http://allafrica.com/stories/200603160926.html>
- Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.
- Quaker United Nations Office. "Small Arms and Light Weapons at the United Nations".
<http://www.quno.org/disarmament/salw/smallarmsUN.htm>
- Rice, Susan E. and Stewart Patrick. "Index of State Weakness in the Developing World". The Brookings Institution. pg 5. 2008. http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/02_weak_states_index.aspx
- R.T. Naylor, "The Structure and Operation of the Modern Arms Black Market," in Jeffrey Boutwell, et al, eds., *Lethal Commerce: the Global Trade in Small arms and Light Weapons* (Cambridge: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995) 48. Qtd. in Stohl, Rachel. "Fighting the Illicit Trafficking of Small Arms". <http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=2996>
- Small Arms Survey. "Arms Brokering".
<http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/brokering/brok.html>
- ² Small Arms Survey. "Small Arms Survey 2005".
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/publications/year_b_pdf/2005/2005SAS_intro_en.pdf
- Stohl, Rachel. "The Tangled Web of Illicit Arms Trafficking". Pp21-26. *Center for American Progress*.
<http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/terrorinshadows-stohl.pdf>
- "Trafficking in Illicit Arms in the DR Congo is a 'genuine threat' to peace: UN Team". July 20, 2006.
<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=19264&Cr=&Cr1>
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. "Violence, Crime and Illegal Arms Trafficking in Colombia" pg 26.
http://www.fas.org/asmp/resources/govern/109th/UNODC_Colombia_Dec06_en.pdf
- Yankey
- Wayne, Valerie and Poulton, Robin Edward. "Curbing Illicit Brokering in the Arms Trade".
http://www.freedomfromfearmagazine.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=90:curbing-illicit-brokering-in-the-arms-trade&catid=37:issue-1&Itemid=159

